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PAPERS, PLEASE: DOES THE CONSTITUTION PERMIT
THE STATES A ROLE IN IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT?
JOHN C. EASTMAN*
Arizona kicked up quite a dust storm in 2010 when it en‐
acted Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070).1 Proponents hoped the law
would help Arizona control the burgeoning illegal immigration
into the state and its attendant costs—costs that affect the fi‐
nancial stability of the state, the safety of its residents, and the
very rule of law itself. The legal professoriate almost uniformly
derided Arizona’s new law as an unconstitutional usurpation
of immigration policy—an area that the Constitution assigns
exclusively to the federal government.2 In particular, commen‐
tators targeted Section 2 of the law, which requires police offi‐
cers to verify the immigration status of anyone who is lawfully
detained, contending that it is patently unconstitutional under
Hines v. Davidowitz3 and would require racial profiling.4
Critics similarly derided Alabama’s new immigration law,
particularly Section 28 of the Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
* Henry Salvatori Professor of Law & Community Service and former Dean,
Chapman University School of Law. He is the founding director of the Center for
Constitutional Jurisprudence, on whose behalf he has been representing several
members of Congress as amici curiae in support of Arizona, both in the Ninth
Circuit and before the Supreme Court, in the litigation challenging the constitu‐
tionality of S.B. 1070.
1. Arizona Governor Janice Brewer signed S.B. 1070 into law on April 23, 2010.
S.B. 1070, 49th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). On April 30, Governor
Brewer signed H.B. 2162, which amended S.B. 1070 but retained the intent and
core components of that law, and was intended to take effect on July 29, 2010. H.B.
2162, 49th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt.
1, § 1(3).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
3. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
4. See, e.g., Robert F. Castro, XENOMORPH!!: Indians, Latina/os, and Alien Mor‐
phology of Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 46 HARV. C.R.‐C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011); Andrea
Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and Disenfran‐
chisement, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35 (2011).
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Act,5 which requires every public elementary and secondary
school in the state to determine if an enrolling student is law‐
fully present in the United States.6 Critics contended that the
law ran afoul of the 1982 case of Plyler v. Doe,7 in which the Su‐
preme Court held that denying free public school education to
illegal immigrants violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s re‐
quirement of equal protection.8
This Essay explores the legal challenges to the two statutes,
addresses how the Department of Justice (DOJ) fundamentally
misunderstands the nature of state sovereignty and federalism,
and concludes that, with the possible exception of one provision
of the Arizona law, the states are acting well within their author‐
ity to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their residents
without intruding on the plenary power over immigration and
naturalization that the U.S. Constitution vests in Congress.
I.

ARIZONA’S S.B. 1070

“In response to a serious problem of unauthorized immigra‐
tion along the Arizona‐Mexico border, the State of Arizona en‐
acted its own immigration law enforcement policy” in April
2010, making “attrition through enforcement the public policy
of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.”9 Thus
begins the Ninth Circuit’s opinion addressing the constitu‐
tional challenges to the Arizona law, and although that court
affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction of portions
of the law,10 the description of Arizona’s purpose is almost en‐
tirely correct. Arizona does have a serious problem with illegal
immigration. As the district court more emphatically described
the situation, the Arizona legislature adopted S.B. 1070 “[a]gainst
a backdrop of rampant illegal immigration, escalating drug and
human trafficking crimes, and serious public safety concerns.”11

5. Beason‐Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011).
6. Id. § 28(a)(1).
7. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
8. See id. at 240.
9. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 343–44 (9th Cir. 2011).
10. Id. at 344.
11. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D. Ariz. 2010).
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Additionally, S.B. 1070 explicitly describes its purpose as “attri‐
tion through enforcement”12 and sets out Arizona’s policy for how
state law enforcement deals with issues related to illegal immigra‐
tion in the state.
Although one might quite properly take issue with the Ninth
Circuit’s substitution of the word “unauthorized” for “illegal”
as a ratification of the Orwellian effort by many in the pro‐
illegal immigration movement to use more innocuous words
like “undocumented” or “unauthorized” to minimize the ille‐
gality of illegal immigration, that semantic fight is a sideshow
that does not really affect the merits of the legal challenge.
More relevant to the substance of the challenge, and more in
dispute, is the loaded use of the word “own.” Whether Arizona
has embarked upon its “own” immigration policy or simply
directed its law enforcement officials to help with the enforce‐
ment of federal immigration law, is, of course, the crux of the
dispute. The same preamble that contains the “attrition
through enforcement” language also mentions the legislature’s
finding that the state has “a compelling interest in the coopera‐
tive enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . .”13 Moreover,
the Act expressly provides that the terms of the statute “shall
be construed to have the meanings given to them under federal
immigration law”14 and that the “act shall be implemented in a
manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigra‐
tion . . . .”15 This language rebuts the notion that Arizona has
somehow embarked upon a maverick course to develop its
own rules regarding immigration into the state.
The Arizona statute, officially called the “Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,”16 contains ten op‐
erative sections. Section 2, which in turn is broken down into
ten subparts, prohibits Arizona officials, agencies, and political
subdivisions from limiting enforcement of federal immigration
laws; requires that they work with federal officials regarding
unlawfully present aliens; and authorizes suits by lawful Ari‐
zona residents against any Arizona official, agency, or political
12. S.B. 1070, 49th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., § 1 (Ariz. 2010).
13. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 11 (emphasis added).
14. Id. § 11.
15. Id. §§ 2(K), 12(C).
16. Id. § 13.
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subdivision that adopts a policy of restricting enforcement of
federal immigration laws.17 Subsection (K) specifically provides
that the Section “shall be implemented in a manner consistent
with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil
rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immuni‐
ties of United States citizens.”18
The remaining subdivision of Section 2 has generated most
of the controversy. With the amendments adopted seven days
after passage of the original bill, H.B. 2162 Subsection (B) pro‐
vides in full:19
For any lawful contact STOP, DETENTION OR ARREST
made by a law enforcement official or a law enforcement
agency of this state or a law enforcement official or a law en‐
forcement agency of a county, city, town or other political
subdivision of this state IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANY
OTHER LAW OR ORDINANCE OF A COUNTY, CITY OR
TOWN OR THIS STATE where reasonable suspicion exists
that the person is an alien who AND is unlawfully present
in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made,
when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the
person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct
an investigation. Any person who is arrested shall have the
person’s immigration status determined before the person is
released. The person’s immigration status shall be verified
with the federal government pursuant to 8 United States
code section 1373(c). A law enforcement official or agency of
this state or a county, city, town or other political subdivi‐
sion of this state may not solely consider race, color or na‐
tional origin in implementing the requirements of this sub‐
section except to the extent permitted by the United States or
Arizona Constitution. A person is presumed to not be an
alien who is unlawfully present in the United States if the
person provides to the law enforcement officer or agency
any of the following:
1. A valid Arizona driver license.
2. A valid Arizona nonoperating identification license.
17. See id. § 2. These provisions, which might collectively be called the anti‐
sanctuary city provisions, are codified at Arizona Revised Statutes § 11‐1051(A),
(C)–(K). See id.
18. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 2(K) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11‐1051(L)).
19. Deletions are noted in strikeout, additions are noted in capital letters.
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3. A valid tribal enrollment card or other form of tribal
identification.
4. If the entity requires proof of legal presence in the
United States before issuance, any valid United States
federal, state or local government issued identification.20

Another provision of S.B. 1070, Section 3, creates a new state
crime for conduct that is already a crime under federal law: fail‐
ure to carry immigration papers.21 The provision imposes the
identical punishment provided by federal law,22 and expressly
“does not apply to a person who maintains authorization from
the federal government to remain in the United States.”23
Section 4 amends the existing Arizona law targeting human
smuggling (already broadly defined to include knowingly fa‐
cilitating the transportation of persons not lawfully in the
United States or who have attempted to enter, entered, or re‐
mained in the United States in violation of federal law)24 “for
profit or commercial purpose,” by allowing a peace officer to
lawfully stop anyone operating a motor vehicle if the officer
has reasonable suspicion to believe the person is in violation of
any civil traffic law.25
Section 5 makes it illegal to hire workers from a motor vehi‐
cle (or to be so hired) if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the
normal flow of traffic;26 to seek employment as an unauthor‐
ized alien (as defined by federal law);27 and to transport, con‐
ceal or harbor illegal aliens in furtherance of the illegal pres‐
ence of the alien in the United States (with vehicles used for the
purpose subject to impoundment, per Section 10 of the Act).28
As amended, this Section expressly provides that law enforce‐
20. H.B. 2162, 49th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
21. See Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐1509).
22. The original version of S.B. 1070 mandated a minimum fine of $500 and jail time
as required for other Class 1 misdemeanors, but the H.B. 2162 amendments reduced
the punishment to a $100 fine and up to thirty days in jail, the same as in federal law.
Compare Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 3, with Ariz. H.B. 2162, and 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (2006).
23. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐1509(F)).
24. Id. § 4 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐2319(F)(3)).
25. Id. § 4 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐2319(A), (E)).
26. Id § 5 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐2928(A)–(B)).
27. Id. (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐2928(C), (E)(2)).
28. Id. (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13‐2928, 13‐2929); id. § 10 (codified
at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28‐3511(A)(4)‐(5)).
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ment officials “may not consider race, color or national origin
in the enforcement of [Section 5] except to the extent permitted
by the United States or Arizona Constitution.”29
In the remaining sections, Section 6 allows law enforcement
officers to make a warrantless arrest if they have probable cause
to believe the person has committed a public offense that makes
that person removable (deportable) from the United States.30 Sec‐
tions 7 and 8 add an entrapment affirmative defense to the Ari‐
zona law revoking the business licenses of businesses knowingly
hiring illegal immigrants,31 a law that the Supreme Court upheld
against a federal preemption challenge in Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting.32 Section 9 adds a record‐keeping requirement to the
existing E‐Verify employment eligibility provisions of Arizona
law.33 Section 10 adds the transportation and harboring of illegal
aliens to the list of grounds for motor vehicle impoundment,34
and Section 11 creates the Gang and Immigration Intelligence
Team Enforcement Mission Fund, for gang and immigration en‐
forcement and to reimburse county jails for incarceration costs
related to illegal immigration.35
In response to a lawsuit the DOJ filed against Arizona, the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona prelimi‐
narily enjoined four provisions of the law before it went into ef‐
fect,36 rejected DOJ’s request to enjoin two other provisions that,
on the District Court’s own reasoning, seemed equally problem‐
atic,37 and rejected DOJ’s broader request to enjoin enforcement
of the entire act beyond the six specific provisions that it had
challenged.38 On appeal by Arizona,39 the United States Court of

29. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 5 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐2928(D)).
30. Id. § 6 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐3883(A)(5)).
31. Id. § 7 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23‐212(K)); id. § 8 (codified at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23‐212.01(K)).
32. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
33. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 9 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23‐214(A)).
34. Id. § 10 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28‐3511(4)–(5)).
35. Id. § 11 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41‐1724).
36. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Ariz. 2010).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 986.
39. The DOJ did not appeal the denial of its request to enjoin two of the provi‐
sions or, more broadly, the entire statute. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d
339, 344 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s pre‐
liminary injunction.40 The Supreme Court granted the State’s pe‐
tition for writ of certiorari in December 2011.41
Those in the legal academy and at DOJ who contend that S.B.
1070 is an unconstitutional intrusion upon Congress’s plenary
authority over immigration rely most heavily on the Supreme
Court’s 1941 decision Hines v. Davidowitz. Pennsylvania passed
an alien registration law in 1939, requiring all aliens over the
age of eighteen to register annually with the state, pay a one‐
dollar annual registration fee, and carry their registration card
with them at all times.42 A three‐judge district court enjoined
the law as unconstitutional, holding that the law denied aliens
the equal protection of the laws and encroached upon legisla‐
tive powers constitutionally vested in the federal government.43
But before the Supreme Court could hear the State’s appeal,
Congress adopted its own alien registration act, requiring that
all aliens over the age of fourteen register a single time (rather
than annually) with federal immigration officials.44 In addi‐
tion to requiring less‐frequent filing, the federal law did not
require aliens to carry a registration card, and only willful
failure to register (as opposed to any failure under Pennsyl‐
vania law) to register was made a criminal offense.45 Federal
penalties, however, were more stringent. Violation of the fed‐
eral statute was punishable by a fine of up to $1000, impris‐
onment of not more than six months, or both, while violation
of the Pennsylvania law was punishable by a fine of up to
$100, or sixty days in jail, or both.46
Although those challenging the Pennsylvania law argued
that it was unconstitutional even before Congress adopted the
federal incarnation, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the
claims challenging the state law, “expressly leaving open” the
contentions rooted in the state of affairs before the federal law

40. Id.
41. Arizona v. United States, No. 11‐182, 2011 WL 3556224 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011),
at *1.
42. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 59 (1941).
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 60–61.
46. Id. at 59–61.
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was adopted, “including the argument that the federal power
in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive.”47
Instead, the Supreme Court held that:
[w]hen the national government by treaty or statute has es‐
tablished rules and regulations touching the rights, privi‐
leges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or
statute is the supreme law of the land. No state can add to or
take from the force and effect of such treaty or statute . . . .48

After explaining the importance of leaving federal power in
fields affecting foreign affairs “entirely free from local interfer‐
ence,” lest the actions of one state create international repercus‐
sions that affect the entire nation,49 the Court elaborated that:
where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior
authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regu‐
lation and has therein provided a standard for the registration
of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of
Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the
federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.50

Given the comprehensive nature of federal immigration law,
Hines would seem to provide solid precedent for the claim that
Arizona’s statute is preempted. But there is another relevant Su‐
preme Court case, decided thirty‐five years after Hines, in which
the Court took a more nuanced view and recognized that the
States are not without authority to exercise core state police
powers even in matters that touch federal immigration policy. In
De Canas v. Bica,51 the Court confronted a challenge to a state
statute prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring unlawful
aliens on the grounds that it amounted to state regulation of
immigration and thus was preempted by federal law.52 The
Court held that federal immigration law did not prevent the
States from regulating the employment of illegal aliens because
States possess broad authority under their police powers to
regulate employment and protect workers within their borders.53
47. Id. at 62.
48. Id. at 62–63 (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 63.
50. Id. at 66–67.
51. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
52. Id. at 352–53.
53. See id. at 356–58.
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“[T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not
[alone] render it a regulation of immigration,”54 the Court held.
The Court’s decision apparently rejected the challenge left un‐
addressed in Hines, namely, whether “the federal power in this
field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive.”55
The principle established in De Canas was most recently ap‐
plied in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, in which the Court
upheld the Legal Arizona Workers Act against challenges
based on federal law preemption, with the Court relying on
principles of state police power.56 The Court held that the state
law, which penalized employers of illegal aliens by withdrawing
permission to do business in the state—a penalty much harsher
than the fines imposed under federal immigration law—was not
expressly preempted under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2), nor was it
preempted by implication.57 On the contrary, the express pre‐
emption clause of the federal statute had an explicit exemption
for state licensing laws, and the Court rejected the argument
that the exemption should be read narrowly, in part because
the state was operating in an area of traditional state concern.58
As these and other cases demonstrate, the States retain sig‐
nificant power to police their internal affairs to protect their
citizens and lawful residents. Arizona’s S.B. 1070 was adopted
expressly to protect the residents of Arizona from violent at‐
tacks and other harms caused by unlawfully present aliens,
and it did so by authorizing its own law enforcement officials
to assist with the enforcement of federal immigration law.
The district court correctly upheld a number of the provi‐
sions of S.B. 1070 that clearly fit within this police‐power au‐
thority of the States, including subsections A and C through L
of Section 2;59 parts of Section 5;60 Section 4;61 and Sections 7
through 13.62 The district court’s analysis in support of its deci‐

54. Id. at 355.
55. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62.
56. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1979–81 (2011).
57. Id. at 1981, 1985.
58. Id. at 1984–85.
59. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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sion preliminarily enjoining the remaining provisions of S.B.
1070,63 however, was both sophomoric and fundamentally
flawed in its understanding of federalism. Those provisions—
subsection B of Section 2 (requiring local law enforcement to
verify immigration status upon reasonable suspicion), Section 3
(creating a state‐law crime for failure to carry immigration pa‐
pers as required by federal law), part of Section 5 (making it
illegal for an illegal immigrant to solicit, apply for, or perform
work), and Section 6 (authorizing warrantless arrest where
there is probable cause to believe the alien has committed a
removable offense)—also involve an exercise of the state’s po‐
lice powers to deal with the collateral health, safety, and wel‐
fare impacts of illegal immigration in the state, and do so in
ways that are virtually indistinguishable from the police power
authority that undergirds the provisions that were upheld. The
district court enjoined Section 5(C), for example, which prohib‐
ited illegal immigrants from seeking work,64 even though the
Supreme Court in Whiting already upheld parallel provisions
of Arizona state law that prohibit employers from hiring illegal
immigrants.65 And the district court enjoined Section 3, making
it a state‐law crime for non‐naturalized immigrants to fail to
carry the immigration papers that federal law requires them to
carry,66 while declining DOJ’s specific request to enjoin Section
4, making it a state‐law crime to transport or harbor illegal im‐
migrants,67 and DOJ’s generalized request to enjoin Section
5(A) and (B), making it a state‐law crime to hire or be hired
from a vehicle that, in stopping, impedes traffic.68
More significantly, Judge Bolton, who presided over the case
in the district court, made several factual and legal errors in her
decision to grant preliminary injunctions of Sections 2(B), 3,
5(C), and 6 of the Act. For example, two sentences in the mid‐
dle of Section 2(B), when read in isolation, seem to require
submission of an overwhelming volume of immigration status
requests to the federal government: “Any person who is ar‐
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1000–02.
65. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011).
66. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 998–99.
67. Id. at 999–1000.
68. Id. at 986, 1008.
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rested shall have the person’s immigration status determined
before the person is released. The person’s immigration status
shall be verified with the federal government pursuant to 8
United States Code § 1373(c).”69 Judge Bolton relied on the con‐
tention that the requirement would impose undue burdens on
lawful residents, as well as overwhelm federal resources, to
invalidate the provision.70 But in doing so, she refused to credit
a narrowing construction of the provision, derived from its
context, that was definitively provided by authorized represen‐
tatives of the State. Immediately before the relevant sentences,
for example, is the requirement that law enforcement shall
make a “reasonable attempt . . . when practicable, to determine the
immigration status” of any person with whom lawful contact
(later amended to clarify “stop, detention or arrest”) by law
enforcement is made “where reasonable suspicion exists that the
person is an alien . . . .”71 Immediately after the offending sen‐
tences, Section 2(B) sets out four ways in which an alien is “pre‐
sumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully present in the
United States”—by providing a valid Arizona driver’s license or
any other government‐issued identification that required proof
of lawful presence in the United States before issuance.72 Not
unreasonably, the state argued that the two sentences should be
read in reference to the paragraph as a whole, such that the rea‐
sonableness caveat in the preceding sentences, or the presump‐
tions in the following sentences, or both, would modify, and
therefore limit, the volume of requests that would be transmitted
to the federal government,73 thereby alleviating the concern that
led Judge Bolton to enjoin enforcement of the law. Accepting
such a narrowed construction by the State, when the language is
“fairly susceptible” to the proffered construction, not only is the
norm but also is compelled by the constitutional avoidance doc‐
trine: “[t]he elementary rule . . . that every reasonable construc‐
tion must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconsti‐
69. S.B. 1070, 49th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., § 2(B) (Ariz. 2010) (codified at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11‐1051(B)).
70. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. at 993–96.
71. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 2(B) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11‐1051(B)) (em‐
phases added).
72. Id.
73. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10,
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (No. 210CV01413).
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tutionality.”74 That rule, stemming from Chief Justice John Mar‐
shall’s 1804 opinion in The Charming Betsy75 applies not just to
cases involving federal statutes but to those interpreting state
statutes as well. “So far as statutes fairly may be construed in
such a way as to avoid doubtful constitutional questions,” the
Supreme Court noted nearly a century ago in Fox v. Washington,
“they should be so construed; and it is to be presumed that state
laws will be construed in that way by the state courts.”76
In yet another example of legal error, after erroneously fail‐
ing to credit Arizona’s narrowing construction of Section 2(B),
Judge Bolton used the resulting burden on the federal govern‐
ment that the DOJ claimed would flow from the increased num‐
ber of immigration status inquiries mandated by the section to
hold, without citation to any authority, that the burden created
an “inference of preemption.”77 The law, of course, is generally
the opposite. There is a presumption against preemption, not an
inference in favor of it. As the Court stated in De Canas v. Bica:
[W]e will not presume that Congress, in enacting the [Immi‐
gration and Nationality Act], intended to oust state author‐
ity to regulate . . . in a manner consistent with pertinent fed‐
eral laws. Only a demonstration that complete ouster of state
power—including state power to promulgate laws not in

74. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun‐
cil, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657
(1895)).
75. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
76. 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915) (citing United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407–08 (1909)).
77. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 998 (D. Ariz. 2010). Judge Bol‐
ton acknowledged, and apparently did not have any concern about, the fact that
law enforcement officials in Arizona already had the discretion to direct immigra‐
tion status inquiries to the federal government, or that the federal government, by
law, has an “obligation” to respond to such inquiries. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (“Ob‐
ligation to respond to inquiries”: “The Immigration and Naturalization Service
shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seek‐
ing to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual
within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by pro‐
viding the requested verification or status information.”). Just how a decision by
the state to define in advance how its own state officials should exercise that dis‐
cretion alters the legal calculus so much that a different preemption presumption
should prevail, Judge Bolton did not say.
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conflict with federal laws—was “the clear and manifest pur‐
pose of Congress” would justify that conclusion.78

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent preemption decisions
demonstrate an increasing suspicion of implied preemption
claims. As the Court noted just last year in Whiting, “[i]mplied
preemption analysis does not justify a ‘freewheeling judicial in‐
quiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objec‐
tives’; such an endeavor ‘would undercut the principle that it is
Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law.’”79
To provide an example of factual error: Judge Bolton also
found that the first sentence of subsection 2(B)—the require‐
ment to ascertain immigration status during any stop or arrest
upon reasonable suspicion—likely was unconstitutional, ac‐
cepting DOJ’s claim that “the federal government has long re‐
jected a system by which aliens’ papers are routinely de‐
manded and checked.”80 That claim is manifestly untrue.
Federal law, which Judge Bolton herself quotes later in the
opinion when discussing a different provision of S.B. 1070, is
quite explicit: “Every alien, eighteen years of age and over,
shall at all times carry with him and have in his personal pos‐
session any certificate of alien registration or alien registration
receipt card issued to him pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section.”81 Failure to comply is a misdemeanor, subjecting the
offender to a fine of up to $100, imprisonment of up to thirty
days, or both.82 Failure to apply for the required registration
card in the first place carries a fine of up to $1000, imprison‐
ment of up to six months, or both.83
Judge Bolton’s struggle with the law and facts did not im‐
prove when she turned to Section 3, the provision making it a
state law crime to fail to carry immigration papers, which federal
law requires be carried at all times.84 Judge Bolton held that the
78. 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963)).
79. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (quoting
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., con‐
curring in part and concurring in judgment)).
80. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (2006).
82. Id.
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a).
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e).
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provision was “an impermissible attempt by Arizona to regulate
alien registration” because “[a]lthough the alien registration re‐
quirements remain uniform,”85 the Section alters the penalties es‐
tablished by Congress under the federal registration scheme”
and for that reason “stands as an obstacle to the uniform, federal
registration scheme . . . .”86 The penalty for violating the federal
law is up to $100 fine and up to sixty days imprisonment.87 The
penalty for violating Section 3 is a maximum fine of $100 and a
maximum of twenty days in jail for a first violation and up to
thirty days in jail for any subsequent violation.88 The two penalty
provisions are virtually identical; the only difference is that Ari‐
zona capped the discretionary imprisonment for first offenders
at twenty days rather than at thirty, a modification that does not
alter congressionally mandated penalties because it is encom‐
passed within the federal “up to 30 days” language.89
It is hard to fathom how such a minor difference qualifies as
an “obstacle to the uniform, federal registration scheme,” yet,
by her material exaggeration, Judge Bolton avoided the more
difficult inquiry that actually makes the validity of Section 3 a
close call. As anyone old enough to remember the 1992 race
riots in Los Angeles that followed the state‐court acquittal of
the police officers charged in the beating of Rodney King, Sgt.
Stacey Koon and his fellow police officers were subsequently
prosecuted in federal court and convicted.90 The second prose‐
cution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because of the controversial doctrine of dual sov‐
85. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 999. This point could not be contested, because
Arizona’s provision incorporates by reference the federal requirement. S.B. 1070,
49th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess, § 3 (Ariz. 2010) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13‐1509(A)).
86. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (emphasis added).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e).
88. Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐1509(H)).
89. Judge Bolton descriptively noted that “Section 3 also limits violators’ eligi‐
bility for suspension of sentence, probation, pardon, and commutation of a sen‐
tence and requires violators to pay jail costs.” Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (cit‐
ing Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐1509(D), (E))). But
she did not address whether those provisions differ from federal law, or if they
do, how limiting a priori the sentencing discretion available to any judge could
stand as an obstacle to the uniform federal registration scheme.
90. Seth Mydans, Verdict in Los Angeles: 2 of 4 Officers Found Guilty in Los Angeles
Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at A1.
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ereignty, in which a second prosecution brought by a different
sovereign (state followed by federal, or federal followed by
state), though based on the same conduct, is permitted.91
By creating a separate state crime, Arizona could be exposing
illegal aliens to double prosecution, with the possibility of
double convictions (and double the penalties), or conviction
after an acquittal, or at the very least the burden of defending
against two separate court actions. That would certainly pro‐
vide a more serious challenge to Section 3 under a Hines v.
Davidowitz analysis than the specious grounds Judge Bolton
relied upon. Even that is an open question, one for which the
State would not be without significant defenses. Does the doc‐
trine of dual sovereignty even apply when both the state and
federal crimes are defined by reference to the same federal
statute, for example? The so‐called Bartkus exception to the
dual sovereignty doctrine, though limited, seems close to point.
Relying on dicta in Bartkus v. Illinois,92 a number of circuit
courts have recognized that the dual sovereignty doctrine does
not apply, and the Double Jeopardy Clause can be violated de‐
spite single prosecutions by separate sovereigns, when one
prosecuting sovereign can be said to be acting as a tool of the
other, or where the second prosecution is merely pursued as a
sham on behalf of the first sovereign.93 Even if the dual sover‐
eignty doctrine might apply, should that possibility invalidate
the state statute ab initio, on a facial challenge, or simply be
grounds for subsequent “as applied” consideration in the event
a second prosecution is ever brought? Section 3 is the provision
of S.B. 1070 that is most susceptible to challenge under the
Hines analysis: its constitutionality is an open question, cer‐
tainly much closer than Judge Bolton credited.

91. See Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars: The Cause for a Civil Rights “Excep‐
tion,” 41 UCLA L. REV. 649, 652–53 (1994); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,
132–33 (1959).
92. 359 U.S. at 123–24.
93. See, e.g., United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 494
(2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Certain Real Prop. & Premises Known as 38
Whalers Cove Drive, Babylon, N.Y., 954 F.2d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 1992)); In re Kunstler,
914 F.2d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Guy, 903 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Moore, 822 F.2d 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ale‐
man, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79–80
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming the district court’s is‐
suance of a preliminary injunction repeats the district court’s
errors and adds some new ones. Had the Ninth Circuit ac‐
cepted Arizona’s narrowing interpretation of its own statute
(Section 2(B)) it would have avoided the constitutional prob‐
lem; instead the court adopted an interpretation that created a
constitutional problem.94 It refused to read sentences in Section
2(B) in context with the rest of the provision (although it later
insisted on doing so with respect to a federal statute that might
otherwise have suffered a similar interpretative error).95 The
court made the nonsensical point that Arizona’s decision to as‐
sist with the enforcement of federal immigration law would
somehow “interfere[] with the federal government’s authority
to implement its priorities . . . .”96 One would have thought that
securing additional resources for its enforcement efforts, the
federal government would be better able to implement its own
priorities, not less. The Ninth Circuit also contended that “the
record unmistakably demonstrates that S.B. 1070 has had a dele‐
terious effect on the United States’ foreign relations,”97 even
though there was no evidentiary “record”98 and the injunction
was issued before S.B. 1070 even took effect.99

94. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 347–48 (9th Cir. 2011).
95. Id. at 351 (“Because our task is to interpret the meaning of many INA provi‐
sions as a whole, not § 1373(c) and § 1357(g)(10) at the expense of all others, we
are not persuaded by the dissentʹs argument, which considers these provisions in
stark isolation from the rest of the statute.”). In contrast, when interpreting Ari‐
zona’s Section 2(B), the Ninth Circuit (following the district court), read two sen‐
tences in stark isolation from the other sentences in the same paragraph of the
same section. See id. at 347–48.
96. Id. at 351.
97. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
98. As with most preliminary injunction decisions, the district court issued a in‐
junction before any evidence was taken.
99. The Ninth Circuit had the benefit of briefing by the United Mexican States,
the nation from which the largest number of illegal immigrants to the United
States hail. In the brief, Mexico intimated that U.S. officials secretly made “com‐
mitments” to give a low priority to enforcement of U.S. immigration laws, see
Brief of Amicus Curiae United Mexican States in support of Plaintiff‐Appellee,
Arizona, 641 F.3d at 339, at 2, and conclusorily claimed, parroting the position of
the DOJ, “that SB 1070 encourages an unacceptable risk of unfair and dispropor‐
tionate targeting of Latinos,” id. at 15, without the law even having gone into ef‐
fect.
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By far the most glaring error is a broad conceptual one. The
Ninth Circuit appears to have adopted the view that the States
not only are bound by prohibitions in the U.S. Constitution but
exclusively derive their positive authority from that document
as well. For example, it noted early in the opinion that “Con‐
gress has instructed under what conditions state officials are
permitted to assist the Executive in the enforcement of immi‐
gration laws.”100 Later, it held that “Subsection (g)(10) [of 8
U.S.C. § 1357] does not operate as a broad alternative grant of
authority for state officers to systematically enforce the [Immi‐
gration and Nationality Act] outside of the restrictions set forth
in subsections (g)(1)–(9).”101 The Court also contended that its
restrictive interpretation of the derivation of state authority is
bolstered by 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10), which authorizes the Attor‐
ney General to deputize state and local law enforcement offi‐
cers “[i]n the event the Attorney General determines that an
actual or imminent mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast
of the United States, or near a land border, presents urgent cir‐
cumstances requiring an immediate Federal response . . . .”102
“If subsection (g)(10) meant that state and local officers could
routinely perform the functions of [Department of Homeland
Security] officers outside the supervision of the Attorney Gen‐
eral,” the court asserted, “there would be no need for Congress
to give the Attorney General the ability, in § 1103(a)(10), to de‐
clare an ‘actual or imminent mass influx of aliens,’ and to au‐
thorize ‘any State or local law enforcement officer’ to perform
the functions of a DHS officer.”103
These statements belie a fundamental conceptual misunder‐
standing of federalism. States do not derive their authority to act
from the Federal Constitution, nor do they require the approval
of federal officials or an Act of Congress to exercise police pow‐
ers in their own states. The Federal Constitution serves only to
limit state authority where specified.104 Conversely, the federal

100. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 at 348.
101. Id. at 349.
102. Id. at 350 n.9 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10)).
103. Id.
104. As originally written, the Constitution’s restrictions on state authority are
found in Article I, Section 10. The list of restrictions was broadened rather dra‐
matically with the Civil War amendments and the subsequent incorporation of
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government both derives its authority from the Federal Consti‐
tution and is limited by it. It is no surprise, then, that in each of
the statutes that the Ninth Circuit cited dealing with federal‐
state enforcement cooperation, authorization is given to federal
officials to enter into such agreements.105 No such authorization
is given to the States, because none is needed. Indeed, quite the
opposite is true. For example, as 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) makes
clear, the Attorney General’s ability to enlist state officials in fed‐
eral enforcement efforts is contingent on “the consent of the head
of the department, agency, or establishment under whose juris‐
diction the individual is serving . . . .”106 To hold otherwise, as
the Ninth Circuit did, is to answer the question left open by the
Supreme Court in Hines in the negative and to repudiate the Su‐
preme Court’s holding in De Canas. Suffice it to say, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court granted Arizona’s petition for a writ of
certiorari to ratify that proposition.
But lest there be any doubt, a lengthy discussion from the
high Court’s recent Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting decision
seems fairly telling. Granted, the Court decided Whiting on
rather technical preemption and statutory interpretation
grounds, but the reasoning seems to put a heavy thumb on
Arizona’s side of the scale in the current case:
And here Arizona went the extra mile in ensuring that its
law closely tracks [the Immigration Reform and Control
Act’s] provisions in all material respects. The Arizona law
begins by adopting the federal definition of who qualifies as
an “unauthorized alien.” Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (an
“unauthorized alien” is an alien not “lawfully admitted for
permanent residence” or not otherwise authorized by fed‐
eral law to be employed) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23–
211(11) (adopting the federal definition of “unauthorized
alien”); see De Canas, 424 U.S., at 363, 96 S. Ct. 933 (finding
no preemption of state law that operates “only with respect
to individuals whom the Federal Government has already
declared cannot work in this country”).

the Bill of Rights, but neither of those developments altered the fact that the States
do not derive their authority to act from the Federal Constitution.
105. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 348–50 & n.9.
106. Id. at 350 n.9.
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Not only that, the Arizona law expressly provides that
state investigators must verify the work authorization of an
allegedly unauthorized alien with the Federal Government,
and “shall not attempt to independently make a final deter‐
mination on whether an alien is authorized to work in the
United States.” § 23–212(B). What is more, a state court
“shall consider only the federal government’s determina‐
tion” when deciding “whether an employee is an unauthor‐
ized alien.” § 23–212(H) (emphasis added). As a result, there
can by definition be no conflict between state and federal
law as to worker authorization, either at the investigatory or
adjudicatory stage.
The federal determination on which the State must rely is
provided under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) . . . . That provision re‐
quires the Federal Government to “verify or ascertain” an
individualʹs “citizenship or immigration status” in response
to a state request
....
From this basic starting point, the Arizona law continues
to trace the federal law. Both the state and federal law pro‐
hibit “knowingly” employing an unauthorized alien. Com‐
pare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 23–212(A). But the state law does not stop there in guard‐
ing against any conflict with the federal law. The Arizona
law provides that “ ‘[k]nowingly employ an unauthorized
alien’ means the actions described in 8 United States Code
§ 1324a,” and that the “term shall be interpreted consistently
with 8 United States Code § 1324a and any applicable fed‐
eral rules and regulations.” § 23–211(8).
The Arizona law provides employers with the same af‐
firmative defense for good‐faith compliance with the I–9
process as does the federal law. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(a)(3) (“A person or entity that establishes that it
has complied in good faith with the [employment verifica‐
tion] requirements of [§ 1324a(b)] with respect to hiring ..
an alien .. has established an affirmative defense that the
person or entity has not violated” the law) with Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 23–212(J) (“an employer that establishes that it
has complied in good faith with the requirements of 8
United States Code section 1324a(b) establishes an affirma‐
tive defense that the employer did not knowingly employ
an unauthorized alien”). And both the federal and Arizona
law accord employers a rebuttable presumption of compli‐
ance with the law when they use E–Verify to validate a
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finding of employment eligibility. Compare IIRIRA
§ 402(b), 110 Stat. 3009–656 to 3009–657 with Ariz.Rev.Stat.
Ann. § 23–212(I).107

S.B. 1070 bears similar indicia of conformity with federal law.
Section 1 describes, for example, the State’s “compelling inter‐
est in the cooperative enforcement of federal immigration
laws.”108 Section 2(A) prohibits local government from “re‐
strict[ing] the enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . .”109
Section 2(B) requires that immigration status “be verified with
the federal government pursuant to 8 United States code sec‐
tion 1373(c).”110 Section 2(K) requires that Section 2 “be im‐
plemented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulat‐
ing immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and
respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citi‐
zens.”111 Section 3 defines the state‐law crime of failure to
carry alien registration documents by incorporating the fed‐
eral criminal statutes.112 Section 5(C)’s prohibition on unau‐
thorized alien’s applying for work in the state incorporates, in
subsection (F)(2), the federal statutory definition of “unau‐
thorized alien.”113 Sections 6 and 7 amend existing provisions
of Arizona law dealing with employment of unauthorized
aliens from the employer’s side, provisions which already in‐
corporated determinations made pursuant to federal law.114
Section 8 requires employers to participate in the federal E‐
Verify program.115 Lest the point still be lost, Section 12(B)
provides that “[t]he terms of this act regarding immigration
shall be construed to have the meanings given to them under
federal immigration law.”116 Finally, Section 12(C) provides
that “[t]his act shall be implemented in a manner consistent
with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil

107. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981–83 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
108. S.B. 1070, 49th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess, § 1 (Ariz. 2010).
109. Id. § 2(A) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11‐1051(A)).
110. Id. § 4(B) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11‐1051(B)).
111. Id. § 4(K) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11‐1051(K)).
112. Id. § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐1509).
113. Id. § 5(E)(2) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13‐2928).
114. Id. §§ 6, 7 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13‐3883, 23‐212).
115. Id. § 8 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23‐212.01).
116. Id. § 12(B).
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rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immu‐
nities of United States citizens.”117
In sum, with the possible (and only possible) exception of
Section 3, Arizona’s S.B. 1070 seems well within the bounds
of state authority, as recognized by the Supreme Court in De
Canas and as the tea leaves from Whiting suggest. As Judge
Bolton herself recognized in rejecting DOJ’s alternative ar‐
gument that Section 5 violated the dormant commerce
clause, that provision of S.B. 1070 “does not attempt to pro‐
hibit entry into Arizona, but rather criminalizes specific con‐
duct already prohibited by federal law.”118 Further, it “cre‐
ates parallel state statutory provisions for conduct already
prohibited by federal law . . . .”119 Yet the entire statute was
designed to parallel, not supplement or detract from, exist‐
ing federal law, a circumstance that seemed to weigh heavily
in the high Court’s holding in Whiting. Perhaps if Judge Bol‐
ton had the benefit of Whiting before she issued her ruling,
she might have applied this discussion from the dormant
commerce clause portion of her opinion to the entirety of
S.B. 1070 and reached a different conclusion.
II.

ALABAMA’S TAXPAYER AND
CITIZEN PROTECTION ACT120

Arizona’s SB 1070 is not the only state immigration reform
attracting national attention as cash‐strapped states attempt to
address the growing costs of illegal immigration. Section 28 of
Alabama’s new Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,121 which
requires every public elementary and secondary school in the
state to determine if an enrolling student is lawfully present in

117. Id. § 12(C).
118. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1004 n.19 (D. Ariz. 2010).
119. Id. at 1003.
120. The analysis in this section was first published in the “Room for Debate” online
opinion section of the New York Times, in October, 2011. See John C. Eastman, Should
Schools Help Catch Illegal Immigrants? Alabama’s Immigration Law is Permissible and Sensi‐
ble, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/04/should‐alabama‐
schools‐help‐catch‐illegal‐immigrants/alabamas‐immigration‐law‐is‐permissible‐and‐
sensible (last updated Nov. 14, 2011).
121. H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011).
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the United States,122 also has gained quite a bit of notoriety. It is
said to run afoul of the 1982 case Plyler v. Doe, in which the Su‐
preme Court held that denying free public school education to
illegal immigrants violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s re‐
quirement of equal protection.123 The district court quite prop‐
erly disagreed, as even a cursory reading of Plyler will confirm.
Alabama’s law does not bar illegal immigrant children from
its public schools, but rather identifies them, gathers statistics
about the scope of the educational services provided to them
and, most importantly, analyzes the impact of providing free
educational services to illegal immigrants on the quality and
cost of education being provided to U.S. citizens.124
Far from violating Plyler, this is the very information lacking in
the record that supported the Court’s ruling in that case. Ac‐
knowledging the district court’s finding that Texas had “failed to
offer any ‘credible supporting evidence that a proportionately
small diminution of the funds spent on each child [which might
result from devoting some state funds to the education of the ex‐
cluded group] will have a grave impact on the quality of educa‐
tion,’” the Supreme Court concluded that “the record in no way
supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is
likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State.”125
Alabama’s law seeks to collect the data necessary to conduct
the analysis the Supreme Court found missing in Plyler. If the
data show that providing free education to those who are
unlawfully present in the United States has no significant effect
on education or its costs, this provision of the Alabama law
likely will not alter the status quo that has existed since Plyler.
But if the data show that providing a free public education to
illegal immigrants severely undermines the quality or drasti‐
cally increases the cost of education for those who are lawful
residents and citizens, the state will have met an important ca‐
veat in the Plyler decision itself.
Plyler was and remains an extremely controversial decision,
issued by a bare majority of the Court over a strong and per‐

122. Id. § 28(a)(1).
123. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
124. Ala. H.B. 56 § 2.
125. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229.
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suasive dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger.126 It
has turned an incidental benefit of illegal immigration—Justice
Brennan’s opinion for the court even noted that “few if any il‐
legal immigrants come to this country, or presumably to the
State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of a free educa‐
tion”127—into a primary attraction for illegal immigration.
In light of all that, Alabama’s effort to collect the data neces‐
sary for the analysis that Justice Brennan was unable to under‐
take in Plyler is not only permissible, but it also is eminently
sensible. We should not let our public policy, much less our
constitutional understanding, be developed behind the veil of
ignorance that has heretofore prevailed on this subject.
Moreover, it is fair to say that the Court has shifted signifi‐
cantly toward the States in questions of federal‐state balance
since Plyler was decided in 1982 (and Garcia v. San Antonio Met‐
ropolitan Transit Authority128 in 1985). Justice Anthony Kennedy
replaced Justice Lewis Powell in 1988, and Justice Clarence
Thomas replaced Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1991. Both have
been more attentive to questions of federalism and of state au‐
thority (Justice Kennedy marginally so; Justice Thomas quite
significantly) than their respective predecessors, both of whom
were members of the Plyler majority.129 The balance shifted back
a bit in 1993 when Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg replaced Justice
Byron White, who had dissented in Plyler, but the pendulum
had still swung enough to give us such pro‐federalism decisions
as United States v. Lopez130 in 1995, United States v. Morrison131 in
2000, and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting132 just last term. Given
126. Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 228 (majority opinion).
128. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
129. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that a pro‐
vision of the Low‐Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act that required states to take
ownership of waste and regulate its disposal according to Congressional instruc‐
tions fell outside Congress’s constitutional authority and was inconsistent with
the Tenth Amendment).
130. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
131. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
132. The movement has not been entirely in this direction, of course. Justice
Kennedy sided with the Plyler‐leaning members of the Court to reject the State’s
position in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), and both he and
Justice Scalia sided with federal preemption in the medical marijuana case out of
California in 2005, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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that Plyler is still controversial thirty years after it was decided,
that the balance on the Court appears to have shifted in an out‐
come‐determinative way, and that the Alabama law seeks to col‐
lect the very information that the Court in Plyler specifically said
Texas had failed to produce in that case, it is certainly not be‐
yond the realm of possibility that the Alabama case will prove to
be the vehicle for a reconsideration of Plyler v. Doe.
CONCLUSION
Responding, in part, to an era of financial dislocation and
stretched budgets, Arizona and Alabama have attempted to
reform their local approaches to immigration. Their solutions
are consistent with federal immigration statutes, and, therefore
violate neither Congress’s statutory scheme for immigration
nor any federal constitutional authority. Thus, during this age
of austerity and rising illegal immigration, these states—and
others—should be allowed to innovate free from DOJ lawsuits
or interference from the courts.

